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9/10/07
Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law
Naomi Cahn and June Carbone∗
[N]o analysis of religious-liberty claims can take place in a vacuum. If the parents
in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose
the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children. Where the child is
mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion
of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.1
Much of the nation is moving toward an "abstinence-only" approach to sex
education, which emphasizes the advantages of confining sex to marriage. But
school systems in liberal communities are heading in the opposite direction,
teaching more about sexual orientation, as well as contraception and abstinence,
in what is termed "comprehensive" sex education.2
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Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241, 242 (1972)( Douglas, J. (dissenting),
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Daniel de Vise, Board Approves Lesson on Sexual Orientation, Wash. Post, June 13, 2007, at p. B5.
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I. Introduction
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court considered whether Amish parents
could be convicted for failing to send their adolescent children to school as required by
the state’s mandatory education law.3 The Court held that the parents’ religious free
exercise claims protected them from prosecution, notwithstanding Justice Douglas’s
warning that this would allow parents to impose their religious views on their children.
The Court disingenuously explained, “our holding today in no degree depends on the
assertion of the religious interest of the child as contrasted with that of the parents.”4.
Abstinence education in contemporary America presents the issue the Supreme
Court explicitly did not decide in Yoder: the extent to which parents’ religious views
may appropriately foreclose their children’s life choices. Abstinence education in the
context of public education does so in a way that is importantly and subtly different from
the much more direct issue in Yoder of mandatory education laws. For the public school
population as a whole, it reinforces a cultural script that encourages early marriage and
reproduction, perpetuates traditional attitudes about sex and gender, and forecloses
greater autonomy in the creation of family life. Moreover, abstinence only education,
which is strongly rooted in religious beliefs, has been shown to be of limited
effectiveness in delaying teen sexual activity, and counterproductive to the extent it
discourages contraceptive use.

3

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Yoder, supra note __, at 231; see generally Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 Pa J Const
L 53, 67 (1999). For more recent Supreme Court statements concerning parental control over their
children’s education, see Elk Grove v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 14-15 (2004).
4
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So long as secular and religious beliefs about the propriety of premarital sex
coincided, and so long as a secular justification for abstinence education existed, such
teachings posed no constitutional issue. As age of family formation increasingly
reinforces class advantage, however, and as the secular justifications for abstinence only
programs become increasingly attenuated, the issue becomes much more direct. Can –
and should – the state mandate instruction whose principal effect is to reinforce religious
understandings of the good life, and does so with disproportionate impact on the life
opportunities of the least advantaged students? While others have explored the rights of
minors to information,5 this paper examines the impact of religion on the politics and
jurisprudence of abstinence education in the context of the contemporary culture war
between red and blue state values.
Underlying these issues are more general questions concerning the relationship
between family law and religion. What role does religion play in the politics of family
law? Does it play a mediating role by providing a foundation for shared values,
individual discipline and social order? Or does religion, with its emphasis on divinely
ordained precepts, contribute to ideological polarization?
The earliest understandings of religion and politics saw religion as a force
constitutive of identity and loyalty. The rise of the nation-state itself rested on shared
religious observances that identified monarchs with divine selection and national identity.
Anthropologist Scott Atran, in describing the origins of his research into an evolutionary
role for religion, explains, ''I started looking at history, and I wondered why no society
5

See, e.g., Catherine Ross Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting Children from
Controversial Speech. 53 Vand. L. Rev. 427 (2000); Hazel Beh & Milton Diamond, Children and
Education: The Failure of Abstinence-Only Education: Minors have a Right to Honest Talk about Sex, 15
Colum. J. Gender & L. 12 (2006).
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ever survived more than three generations without a religious foundation as its raison
d'etre.''6 That religious foundation may be responsible for the growth of human societies
beyond the hundred-and-fifty or so closely related individuals that tended to mark the
outer limits of hunter-gatherer organization.
If religion is therefore critical in defining associations, nations and causes, does
not its very role in providing cohesion also lead to conflict? Indeed, the famed
primatologist Frans de Waal suggests that the development of a sense of morality, which
served as a precursor to the origins of religion, developed out of the need to create
communal bonds against a common adversary.7 He observes, “the profound irony is that
our noblest achievement – morality – has evolutionary ties to our basest behavior—
warfare.”8
The most difficult issues arise, then, when religions differ on core beliefs or when
religious and secular understandings collide in the definition of morality.9 Successful
multicultural societies have historically negotiated careful boundaries in the face of such
divisions. Thus, the United States quickly decided to treat marriage as a civil issue, with
secular authorities determining the all-important issues of legitimacy and inheritance,
while permitting a broad array of religious and secular ceremonies to celebrate the
event.10 It upheld bans on polygamy, reinforcing the identification of the Judeo-Christian

6

Robin Marantz Henig, Darwin's God, N.Y. Times Mag., March 4, 2007, p. 37.
Nicholas Wade, Scientists Find the Beginnings of Morality in Primate Behavior, N.Y. Times, March 20,
2007.
8
Frans de Waal, Our Inner Ape 212 (2005).
9
See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 147 (1993); June Carbone, Autonomy to Choose what Constitutes a
Family: Oxymoron or Basic Right 19 (2006), avail. at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=935418#PaperDownload.
10
For a summary of this history, see Joel Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New
York and Louisiana to the International Community, 40 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 135, 143 (2006); see also
Daniel A. Crane, ABOLISHING CIVIL MARRIAGE: A "JUDEO-CHRISTIAN" ARGUMENT FOR
7
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emphasis on monogamy with the secular values of democracy and equality.11 And it has
granted parents a sphere of authority over their children that includes the ability to insist
that they learn German, but not, as Barbara Woodhouse noted, the ability to send them to
work at too young an age instead.12 Each of these decisions involves reaffirmation of the
core values that define the society of the time and a measure of leeway for religious
observances that can coexist with the core.
This balancing act of religious and secular values becomes most acute, however,
when societal changes pull these two sets of understandings apart. Among the many
emerging divisions in the culture wars that currently pit religious fundamentalists against
the secular coasts is the issue of teen sexuality. At one point in the not so distant past, the
issue would have commanded consensus. A half century ago, unmarried sexuality
would have been widely regarded as sinful, selfish or misguided. Parental vigilance and
authority over teen activity followed accordingly. Schools, whether public or private,
would have been expected to reinforce the dominant norm of premarital chastity. And,
the appropriate response to an improvident pregnancy in both religious and secular circles
was marriage or adoption.13

PRIVATIZING MARRIAGE, 27 Card. L. Rev. 1221 (2006) (comparison of different religious
understandings of marriage).
11
See Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 Utah L. Rev. 308 (1964)
(summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing federal anti-polygamy laws in the second half of the
nineteenth century); Shayna M. Sigman EVERYTHING LAWYERS KNOW ABOUT POLYGAMY IS
WRONG, 16 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 101 (2006)(describing history of legal efforts to outlaw polygamy).
12
See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property,
33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1041-50 (1992). For a discussion of the line drawing between religious and
secular education in a different era, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, "FREE" RELIGION AND "CAPTIVE"
SCHOOLS: PROTESTANTS, CATHOLICS, AND EDUCATION, 1945-1965, 2007, 56 DePaul L. Rev.
1177 (2007) (describing the role of Catholic schools in providing public education, and the resulting
Catholic-Protestant divisions over the practice).
13
For a comprehensive discussion of the role of adoption in reinforcing norms of chastity, see Rickie
Solinger, Wake-Up Little Susie: Single Pregnancy and Race Before Roe v. Wade (1992).
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These views no longer follow so automatically. The average age of marriage has
risen into the mid-twenties, ninety percent of adults will engage in sexual intercourse
before they enter more permanent unions, and the length of time between the beginning
of sexual activity and marriage has reached seven years for women, more for men.14
Managing sexuality has accordingly become more critical in many parts of the country
than deterring intercourse and, indeed, a majority of adults and a supermajority of those
between 18 and 29 no longer object to extramarital intercourse at all.15 Moreover, a
marriage prompted by an improvident teen pregnancy is unlikely to endure or, if the
effect is to derail the parents’ formal education, to provide a solid financial foundation for
childrearing. Accordingly, introduction to effective contraception has become an
important part of the transition to adulthood, and, for many, abortion rather than marriage
or adoption is the necessary fallback.
These shifting views, however, directly threaten the religious teachings that once
underlay the secular as well as sectarian approaches to family values. If sex outside of
marriage is immoral, and marriage is the institution designed by heavenly mandate for
procreation, how can society tolerate divergent views on beliefs so central to the
definition of a “good life?” The differences go to the core of the views that mark
adherence to faith, and the stakes include the ability to influence the life patterns and
beliefs of the next generation. As a result, the deeply religious and secular part of the
country have grown apart on such basic issues as:

14

See Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, avail. at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008544.
15
See id.
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1)

the best approach to teen parenting: assertion of authority v. open
communication and negotiated solutions;16

2)

the existence of homosexuality as a chosen (and immoral) lifestyle or innate
characteristic;17

3)

the role of sexuality as a natural activity to be managed for mutual enjoyment
or as sinful pleasure necessarily restricted to marriage;18

4)

the existence of gender differences as fixed and important to the proper
ordering of family life, or as socially constructed, unnecessary and malleable;19

5)

the acceptability of abortion as a responsible decision not to bear a child in less
than ideal conditions or its rejection as the self-indulgent act of a woman
unwilling to bear the consequences of “sinful” behavior;20

6)

the role of the state as neutral among competing definitions of the good or
necessary to reinforce the fragile underpinnings of the discipline necessary to
realize the promise of Western civilization.21

These differences are differences of belief, culture, style, and personality. To a
degree, they may reflect genetic predisposition.22 They certainly involve differences in
cultural teaching and inheritance. They also play out on regional and racial lines, with
urban and rural variations. And they may be self-perpetuating. To continue to insist on
traditional moral teachings requires marriage relatively soon, if not before, the beginning
of sexual activity. Early marriage, in turn, requires emphasis on abstinence, and
stigmatizing non-marital activity. Early marriage, however, may shortchange educational
opportunities, and increase the risk of divorce,23 which can contribute to greater poverty
for the next generation. These experiences may in turn fuel greater urgency in
reinforcing traditional values. And both early marriage and traditional values emphasize
16

See infra notes and accompanying text.
See infra notes and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes and accompanying text.
19
Although this article focuses less on attitudes toward gender differences, they are an important
component of traditionalist worldviews. See Kristin Luker, Abortion and The Politics of Motherhood
(1985).
20
See infra notes and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes and accompanying text.
22
See infra nn. (discussing Hibbing et al.).
23
See David Popenoe and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Ten Things Teens Should Know about Marriage
(2003), avail. at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SourcesThings4Teens.htm (nothing that teens who
marry may be 200-300% more likely to get divorced than those who marry at a later age).
17
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gendered family roles, and deference to external authority rather than education that
enhances autonomy and the ability to manage choice.
This paper examines the role of religion in reinforcing conflicting approaches to
fundamental cultural values that, in turn, affect the family lives of Americans. Families
who live in red and blue states are experiencing divergent life patterns, and religion
affects the development of these patterns. Frequency of church attendance has been tied
to likelihood of marriage,24 and, as this paper shows, has been profoundly influential in
approaches to teen sexuality. Religion decreases the opportunity for dialogue and
compromise on these issues because, as Section Two discusses, people use underlying
values -- such as religion -- as a way of helping them decide about social issues such as
gay marriage and teen pregnancy. For those who interpret information through a preexisting worldview, more information will not affect the approach to deeply contested
issues. The central part of the paper examines conflicting approaches to the deeply
divisive issue of abstinence education, demonstrating how religion contributes to the
conflict in perspectives. Finally, the paper explores potential means for resolving these
cultural tensions or at least for managing them within a federal system that maintains
fidelity to the rule of law.25 Ultimately, the paper argues that changing religiously
influenced laws, such as those supporting abstinence education, is as much a political and
social process as a legal one.

24

See, e.g., W. Bradford Wilcox, Religion, Race, and Relationships in Urban America (2007), available at
http://center.americanvalues.org/?p=57.
25
See Paul Callister, Identity and Market for Loyalties Theories: The Case for Free Information Flow in
Insurgent Iraq, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 123 (2006) (on the relationship between identity and the rule of
law (SSRN). There is always the risk, of course, as with the abortion cases that to the extent citizens feel
they must choose between adherence to an immoral or unjust law and their individual consciences, the rule
of law itself will be the casualty. Callister makes the point that the danger is particularly great when the
issue goes to the core of identity, which we will argue that it does here.
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II.

RELIGION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE: A TIME OF DIVISION?

The relationship between religion and politics is historically thick and complex. In
contemporary America, scholars are providing increasingly rich exploration of how
religion shapes political campaigns, using sociological, demographic, and psychological
data. Legislation on social issues, such as gay marriage, teenage abortion, and abstinence
education has shown the influence of various religious values at both the state and federal
level. Several researchers have suggested that political efforts to appeal to certain
religious groups is contributing to a dichotomization of American culture, rather than
mediating between extreme positions.26 As this research and legislation suggest,
American society may be developing two different approaches to social issues, one that
claims to be grounded in religious and moral values, while another that claims to be
reflecting the dramatic changes that are occurring to the American family. Social science
techniques deepen understanding of the phenomenon, and these studies emphasize that
the modern role of religion in American politics has changed markedly.
First, the religious divide has become much less one between religions, and much
more one between traditionalists and modernists. David Campbell, in his summary of
these developments, emphasizes that whereas political identification once followed
religious lines – Catholics tended to vote Democratic, mainstream Protestants for the
Republicans – today, the more important differences are those between the devout and

26

E.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, HARVARD INSTITUTE ON ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Discussion Paper
No. 2100, January 2006 (concluding that American political divisions have reverted to their pre-New Deal
form, and have become increasingly religious and cultural). See also John W. Evans, Have Americans’
Attitudes Become More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71 (2004); (concluding that activists
have become more partisan and polarized on values issues); MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS &
JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA. (2004)(disputing the polarization
thesis and maintaining that public attitudes have been remarkably stable).
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the less observant.27
These differences have played out in the most recent elections. The Pew Forum on
Religion & Public Life has found that, of people who attend religious services more than
once per week, 38% voted Democratic, and 60% voted Republican, a number that
remained consistent in 2002, 2004, and 2006.28 Among people who never attend
religious services, 67% vote Democratic, compared to 30% who vote Republican.29
Among white Protestants, 37% voted Democratic, 61% Republican in 2006, a gap that
narrowed from 30% Democratic and 68% Republican in 2002.30
Second, the devout may differ from others in worldviews attributable to more than
time spent in church or even intensity of beliefs. James Hunter observes that
traditionalists in almost all religions seek an "external, definable, and transcendent
authority."31 Indeed, the National Election Survey further identifies traditionalist voting
patterns in accordance with responses to four statements that emphasize openness to
change and attitudes toward family values:
(1)
The world is always changing and moral values should adjust to those
changes.
(2) The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.
(3) We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their
own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.
(4) This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis
on traditional family ties.32
27

David E. Campbell, What Social Science Has To Say About The Culture War, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill of
Rts. J. 59, 64 (2006) (describing a “devotional divide” in which 67% of those who attended services once a
week or more voted Republican in 2004 in comparison with 47% of those who attended services less
often).
28
Religion and the 2006 Elections, available at http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=174.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars? The Struggle to Define America 44 (1991).
32
NES 2004 Post Election Questionnaire, http://www.umich.edu/nes/studypages/2004
prepost/2004prepost.htm (follow "Post-election" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 27, 2007). Campbell reports
that: “Only twenty-four percent of people who score in the bottom quartile of the traditionalism index
voted for Bush in 2004, compared to fifty-five percent in the second quartile, seventy-three percent in the
third, and eighty-four percent in the top quartile. When we compare level of traditionalism versus religious
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Third, these differences in attitudes may correspond to genetic prepositions
toward change and authority. Religious and political identification (Republicans v.
Democrats, Protestants, Jews) is often a product of parental influence and upbringing.33
The choice of more fundamentalist positions within a party or religion, however, is more
likely to reflect individual preferences and personalities. In an innovative study of the
relationship between genes and politics, three political scientists compared identical and
fraternal twins to differentiate the effect of environment from genetics in the development
of political attitudes. 34 The researchers concluded that: “Genetics accounts for
approximately half of the variance in ideology, while shared environment including
parental influence accounts for only 11%." 35
To reach this conclusion, the study used data on the responses of identical and
fraternal twins to 28 different issues, ranging from school prayer to federal housing, and

tradition, it is clearly traditionalism that makes the difference. Among Protestants, in fact, denomination
makes no difference once traditionalism is taken into account. When we look at both evangelical and
mainline Protestants, eighty-nine percent who scored in the highest quartile of moral traditionalism voted
for Bush.”
33
John R. Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing, Are Political Orientations Genetically
Transmitted?, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 153, 157, 160 (2005)(group identification, e.g., the children of
Methodists tend to be Methodists, reflects parental socialization in contrast with views on particular issues).
34
Alford, et al., supra, at 164; for a mild critique, see Barry Burden, The Genetic Bases of Political
Attitudes, http://www.iq.harvard.edu/blog/pb/2005/10/the_genetic_bases_of_political_1.html (“The
process by which specific attitudes are shaped by genetics, therefore, remains largely a black box.). See
also John Hibbing and John Alford, Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as War Cooperators, 48
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 62 (2004); John Orbell, et al., Machiavelllian Intelligences a Basis for the Evolution of
Cooperative Dispositions, 98 AM. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (March 2004). For an argument against their
conclusions, see Why Twin Studies Are Problematic for the Study of Political Ideology:
Rethinking Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?
Elizabeth Suhay and Nathan Kalmoe, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan and Christa
McDermott Department of Psychology, University of Michigan DRAFT, 1 July 2007, Paper prepared for
the International Society of Political Psychology annual meeting in Portland, Oregon, July 3-7, 2007.
35
Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, supra note __, at 158-160. Like others who have engaged in twin research,
the researchers’ basic premise is that because identical (monozygotic) twins are more genetically similar
than dizyogotic twins, then with respect to a “trait that is at least partly heritable the tendency for [mz]
twins to share that characteristic should be stronger than the tendency for [dz] twins.” Id. at 155. See also
John R. Alford and John R. Hibbing, The Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of Behavior, 2
Perspectives on Politics 707 (2004).
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then coded the responses as “conservative” or “liberal.”36 The researchers observe that
while political issues and configurations vary considerably over time, basic divisions
between liberal and conservatives perspectives are remarkably persistent.37 They
accordingly posit two basic – and heritable – political orientations. The first, which the
researchers call “absolutist,” involves:
a relatively strong suspicion of out-groups (e.g., immigrants), a yearning for ingroup unity and strong leadership, especially if there is an out-group threat (“Do
not question the President while we are at war with terrorists”), a desire for clear,
unbending moral and behavioral codes (strict constructionists), a fondness for
swift and severe punishment for violations of this code (the death penalty), a
fondness for systematization (procedural due process), a willingness to tolerate
inequality (opposition to redistributive policies), and an inherently pessimistic
view of human nature (life is “nasty, brutish, and short”).38
The second, more “contextualist,” orientation is characterized by:
Relatively tolerant attitudes toward out-groups, a desire to take a more contextdependent rather than rule-based approach to proper behavior (substantive due
process), an inherently optimistic view of human nature (people should be given
the benefit of the doubt), a distaste for preset punishments (mitigating
circumstances), a preference for group togetherness but not necessarily unity
(“We can all get along even though we are quite different”), suspicion of
hierarchy, certainty, and strong leadership (flip-flopping is not a character flaw),
an aversion to inequality (e.g., support for a graduated income tax), and greater
general empathic tendencies (rehabilitate, don’t punish).39
They suggest that, to the degree that that political divisions correspond to these basic
differences in orientation, they are likely to be more intractable than disagreements over
policy.40 Their conclusions are supported by neurobioloigical research on brain
processes, which show that conservatives like order and consistency and are better able to

36

Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, supra note -_, at 158 (explaining methodology), at 164-65 (describing crosscultural packages of issues considered liberal or conservative).
37
Id. at 164.
38
Id. at 164-65.
39
Id. at 165.
40
Id. at 165-66.
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block out potentially distracting information, while liberals are better able to tolerate
ambiguity and are more open to new information.41
Fourth, given these differences in orientation, the rhetoric and style of political
debate has the potential to diffuse or inflame divisions. Linguist George Lakoff,
combining Norm Chomsky’s research on the deep structure of linguistics with more
recent neuroscience findings, argued in his book Moral Politics that liberals and
conservatives view the world through different metaphors about the relationship between
the state and its citizens, and that these metaphors involve deeply rooted patterns of
perception. The language of political discourse then frames issues, consciously or
unconsciously, in ways that trigger the metaphors, and the metaphors produce associated
reactions that may have relatively little to do with the specific statement that triggered the
response.42
Lakoff maintains that the contrasting metaphors track the paradigm role of parents
with the family.43 Conservatives celebrate the “strict father” while liberals place greater
value on the “nurturing mother.” Those who share the Strict Father mentality see the
world as dangerous; children need to be protected, and it is the responsibility of the strict
father to impose discipline on his children.44 Children are born bad and learn through
punishment.45 By contrast, the nurturant parent mentality views the world as basically

41

See Denise Gellene, Researchers Find Left-Wing Brain, Right-Wing Brain, L.A. Times, Sept. 10, 2007,
at A11.
42
GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2D ED. 2002).
43
GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004);
MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002).
44
Moral Politics; http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/nationasfamily/sfworldview.
45
Interview of George Lakoff (2003),
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml.
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safe, with parents responsible for nurturing their children with empathy and
responsibility.46
Fifth, when political issues are framed in these terms, practically or
metaphorically, they engender deeply held beliefs. Such beliefs are less susceptible to
argument, logic, or facts. Indeed, cultural research suggests that within such arenas when
empirical data conflicts with these beliefs, people reinterpret or deny the empirical
findings rather than changes their views. 47 Consequently, when many people are
confronted with new scientific information on issues that are “culturally disputed . . . men
and women in white lab coats speak with less authority than (mostly) men and women in
black frocks.”48 Attitudes toward homosexuality provide a clear example of this
phenomenon. Twice as many liberals as conservatives say that people are born
homosexual, and 73% of committed white evangelicals think homosexuals can change
their sexual orientation in contrast with two-thirds (66%) of seculars of all races who
state that homosexuality cannot be changed. 49 The relationship between politics and the
pulpit, with Protestant fundamentalist clerics emphasizing the evils of homosexuality
more than mainline Protestant ministers or clergy in other religions, may reinforce
cultural predispositions that are relatively impervious to change.50 New information on,
for example, the genetic basis of homosexuality is thus likely to reinforce the beliefs of
46

Moral Politics; http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/nationasfamily/npworldview
See, e.g., Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, and James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Culture, and
Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 Soc. J. Res. 283 (2005); Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman, Cultural
Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Yale Law & Policy Rev. 147, 163 (2006).see more generally
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/.
48
Kahan and Braman, supra note __, at 165.
49
THE P EW FORUM ON RELIGION AND P UBLIC LIFE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN OPPOSITION
TO H OMOSEXUALITY (2003), http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=37.
50
Id. This does not necessarily mean, however, that causality is uni-dimensional. As Kristin Luker
observed, parishioners may seek out churches whose “sexual teachings support their own values, especially
when they feel that their values were increasingly under assault in the larger culture.” 50 Kristin Luker,
When Sex Goes to School 95-96 (2006).
47
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those predisposed to tolerance rather than change the attitudes of those who see the
conduct as an immoral choice.51
While the tendency to filter data through existing belief systems is true of most
human convictions, it may be particularly true of religious practices. Scott Atran
observes that one of the keys to understanding the role of religion is recognizing that
religious belief requires taking ''what is materially false to be true'' and ''what is
materially true to be false.''52 Rituals are critical to reinforcing such beliefs.
Anthropologist Richard Sosis maintains that while both secular and religious rituals
promote cooperation, religious rituals ''generate greater belief and commitment'' precisely
because they depend on belief – and thus emotion -- rather than logic or proof.53
Emotional commitment, Sosis believes, is deeper and longer-lasting than reason.54 It is
also harder to question and, once instilled, harder to alter. These qualities, of course,
make religion invaluable not only in instilling partisan loyalties, but also in encouraging
responsible behavior.
Finally, political scientists who study the level of polarization in American
politics find that while the views of the electorate have been remarkably stable over the
last forty years, activists have become more partisan and more energized by issues

51

The science on this point remains speculative, however, with intriguing suggestions about the biological
basis of homosexuality that do not, at this point, provide conclusive evidence about its etiology. See
Anthony F. Bogaret, et al, Biological Versus Nonbiological Older Brothers and Men's Sexual Orientation,
103 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences . 10771 (2006)(summarizing literature and
concluding that birth of older brothers increase incidence of male homosexuality).
52
Henig, supra note __. See also Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan, Religion's Evolutionary Landscape:
Counterintuition, Commitment, Compassion, Communion, 27 Beh. and Brain Sci. 713_(2004).
53
For an empirical test of this proposition, see Bradley Ruffle and Richard Sosis, “Does it Pay to Pray?
Costly Ritual and Cooperation, 7 B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 1 (2007) (religious males
in Israel are more likely to cooperate than secular males).
54
Henig, supra note .
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associated with “moral values.”55 These are the issues that have become critical to the
political distinctions between the devout and less devout, traditionalists and modernists,
absolutists and contextualists, strict fathers v. nurturing mothers. Abortion provides a
paradigmatic example.56 Linguist George Lakoff explains:
There are two classical kinds of cases [of women who want abortions].
Unmarried teenage girls who have been having sex but have been careless or
ignorant in the matter of birth control; women who want careers or independence
lives . . . .According to Strict Father morality, an unmarried teenage girl should not
be having teenage sex at all. . . . She has to be responsible for the consequence of her
actions if she is to learn from her mistakes. An abortion would simply sanction her
immoral behavior. .In both of the classical stereotypical cases, abortion violates
Strict Father morality.57
These findings suggest that issues that fall on the dividing lines between the
devout and the secular, and that evoke distinctions between more authoritarian and
flexible political orientations, are likely to be among the more divisive topics on the
political landscape.58 They are likely to be even more intense if either group finds that a
55

For a summary of the extensive political science literature on these issues, see DELIA BALDASSARRI AND
ANDREW GELMAN, PARTISANS WITHOUT CONSTRAINT: POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND TRENDS IN
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, June 13, 2007,
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/BGpolarization4.pdf (finding polarization on
moral issues largely non-existent forty years ago, greater polarization today on moral issues among the
better educated and more politically active, and polarization on moral issues increasing much more
dramatically in since the mid-eighties) and EDWARD L. GLAESER AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND
REALITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, HARVARD INSTITUTE ON ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
Discussion Paper No. 2100, January 2006 (concluding that American political divisions have reverted to
their pre-New Deal form, and have become increasingly religious and cultural). See also John W. Evans,
Have Americans’ Attitudes Become More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71 (2004); MORRIS P.
FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA.
(2004).
56
Abortion, however, does not have a single, fixed political meaning. For a discussion of the
transformation of the abortion use from one that primarily concerned observant Catholics to a broader
symbol of changing family roles, see Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash,__ HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. (forthcoming 2007). See also Evan, supra note
__, at 17 (reporting that findings of polarization on the issue of abortion in various studies since the mideighties).
57
Lakoff, Moral Politics, supra note __, at 267-68.
58
David Barnhizer suggests that the law, and courts, are at the center of the “seismic” cultural conflict, and
that there has been little reasoned discourse from intellectuals on these issues. David Barnhizer, Ideology,
Propaganda and Legal Discourse in the Argument Culture (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975256. While law is central – control of national
appropriations on teen education, for example, helps determine what teens actually learn – we see law as
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particular issue goes to the core of its belief system. Sexuality, particularly in the
context of teen education about contraception, is one such area. It thus poses difficult
dilemmas in separating reasonable public policy choices from the imposition of religious
– and partisan – views about the content of the good life.
The results of the 2004 election suggest that these differences in worldview have
become important political markers. In 2004, President Bush’s religious supporters were
far more likely to emphasize the importance of social issues, while John Kerry’s
supporters focused on economic issues.59 And, among Bush’s religious constituencies,
most asserted that their faith was “more or about as important as other factors in their
voting decision.” In contrast, “a majority of Kerry’s religious constituencies reported that
their faith” was less important.60 In red states, that is, the states that voted Republican, 51
percent of voters identified themselves as evangelical or born again, while the rate in blue
states was 22 percent. 61 Indeed, one possible basis for George Bush’s win in 2004 was
his appeal to traditional American values, an appeal that helped him win the red states.62

the result, rather than the catalyst, of the conflict. The laws that exist reflect certain values; while they may
promote the development of, or revolution against, those values, they exemplify the values of the winning
position. Moreover, we see more reasoned analysis from within and outside of the academy than does
Professor Barnhizer.
59
http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=64
60
. John C. Green et al., The American religious Landscape and the 2004 Presidential Election: Increased
Polarization 13, avail. at http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/postelection.pdf.
61
Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders, Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Myth of a Polarized
America, 3 The Forum 1, 13 (2005), available at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1076&context=forum. The authors used data from
the American National Election Studies and national exit polls.
62
The question of what determined the 2004 election, and how polarized the public is has engendered
substantial commentary. See generally EDWARD L. GLAESER AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND
REALITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 33-34 (2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874977 (noting “the continuum of states ranging
from the poor conservative places of the south and east to the rich, liberal places of the coasts . . . .
[and] that American parties are increasing[sic] oriented around religion and culture rather than
economics”); STEVEN ANSOLABEHERE, JONATHAN RODDEN, AND JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., PURPLE
AMERICA 3 (2005), http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1266 (challenging the
culture war argument and finding that most of the population can be characterized as moderate); Jacob
S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off-Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American
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For those voters who thought moral values were the most important issue in the election,
79% voted for George Bush.63 This constituency, which carries dramatically more clout
in “red state” legislatures, also determines the content of state level policies toward the
always contentious issue of sex education.64
III. RELIGION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE: THE CASE OF
ABSTINENCE EDUCATION
The regulation of sexuality has long been an area of contention,65 but it has not
always been an arena of political contention.66 It is today. State legislatures have
increasingly tended to regulate teen sexuality, prescribing sex education curricula, access
to contraception, and availability of abortion. As the attached chart shows, states
legislatures have been active over the last ten years, and they vary considerably in their
adoption of laws regulating access to abortion, the morning after pill, parental
involvement in teen decision-making, and the content and availability of sex education in
Democracy 42 (2005)(Republican partisan tactics, not a change in concern about moral values,
determined the 2004 election).
63
CBS News, Moral Values: A Decisive Issue?
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/03/60II/main653593.shtml; but see David Brooks, The ValueVotes Myth,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/opinion/06brooks.html?ex=1257483600&en=b4613533d9a1bdde&ei
=5090&partner=rssuserland
64
We take no position on the 2004 election, except to note that it helps identify differences in world view
that correspond to different positions on abstinence education. For the connection, however, between the
2004 vote and religious views, see John C. Green and Mark Silk, Why Moral Values Did Count, 8
RELIGION IN THE NEWS (2005),
http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol8No1/WhyMoral%20ValuesDidCount.htm.
65
For a classic debate on these issues, compare Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 11 (1972)
(arguing for the enforcement of laws against homosexuality and prostitution on the ground that “every
society has the right to conserve its own traditions, to preserve the practices that are distinctive to its
culture”) with H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality 51, 52 (1963) (maintaining that the identification of
fundamental values is fraught with peril and that societies can change without disintegrating).
66
E.g., the Supreme Court observed in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986), that until 1961, all
fifty states had laws banning sodomy. See Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521, 525 (1986). When the Court reversed Bowers in
Lawrence v. Texas, it did so emphasizing that the laws against sodomy were not necessarily directed at
same-sex sodomy, but at all non-procreative sexual activity, 539 U.S. 558, 569-70 (2003), and that an
“emerging awareness” had changed attitudes toward regulation of sexual activity between consenting
adults. Id. at 572.
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public schools. Examining the relationship between adolescent sexuality and religion
makes sense on a variety of different levels. As Mark Regnerus points out: “religion—
together with peers, parent, and the media—remains a primary socialization agent of
children and adolescents . . .[And] sex is a sphere of human behavior high in religious
applicability . .. it is a topic that has more religious relevance—or is more clearly
addressed in most religious traditions – than many other topics.”67
Not surprisingly, then, sex education has become a particularly contentious issue.
Comprehensive sex education (also called “abstinence-plus”68), which includes
information about birth control as well as abstinence, can be contrasted with abstinence
education, which is concerned with only one type of sex education.

Abstinence

education has been federally funded in the public schools since at least 1981, when
Congress enacted the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA).69 The AFLA, which received
$30.6 million in funding in 2006, focuses generally on adolescent sexuality issues,
including pregnancy and parenting.70

The AFLA itself explicitly approves of, and

solicits, the involvement of religious organizations in its programs on teen sexuality.

71

Since 1997, notwithstanding its original mandate, all AFLA prevention have centered on
abstinence education.72
Abstinence education is funded through two additional sources. Title V of the
Social Security Act, enacted as part of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, included
67

Mark D. Regnerus, Forbidden Fruit: Sex & Religion in the Lives of American Teenagers 6-7 (2007). J
Abstinence-plus is the common term for comprehensive sex education (a google search on September 6,
2007 for the term abstinence-plus found 23,000 items).. See, e.g., Carmen Solomon-Fears, Reducing Teen
Pregnancy: Adolescent Family Life and Abstinence Education Programs 6 (2004), avail. at
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS2087310042004.pdf (CRS Report for
Congress).
69
P.L. 97-35, (now codified at 42 U.S.C. 300z (2007)).
70
See http://opa.osophs.dhhs.gov/titlexx/oapp.html.
71
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 606 (1988).
72
Solomon-Fears, supra note __, at 3.
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appropriations specifically designed for abstinence education programs, and the
legislation defined abstinence education as:
an educational or motivational program that:
(A) Has as its exclusive purpose, teaching the social, psychological, and health
gains to be realized by abstaining from sexual activity;
(B) Teaches abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage as the expected
standard for all school age children;
(C) Teaches that abstinence from sexual activity is the only certain way to
avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and other
associated health problems;
(D) Teaches that a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in context of
marriage is the expected standard of human sexual activity;
(E) Teaches that sexual activity outside of the context of marriage is likely to
have harmful psychological and physical effects;
(F) Teaches that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful
consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and society;
(G) Teaches young people how to reject sexual advances and how alcohol and
drug use increases vulnerability to sexual advances; and
(H) Teaches the importance of attaining self-sufficiency before engaging in
sexual activity. 73
Congress has allocated additional funds for abstinence education through
appropriations for Community-Based Abstinence Education (CBAE),74 requiring that
all programs teach every one of the items listed within the definition of abstinence
education.75 CBAE funding is provided directly to recipient organizations, unlike
Title V funding, which is provided to the state.76 Since 1997, all of the Adolescent and
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42 U.S.C. 710(b)(2), a definition that has remained virtually unchanged since 1996. Pub.L. 104- 193,
Title IX, § 912, 110 Stat. 2353 (1996).
74
Carmen Solomon-Fears, CRS Report for Congress, Reducing Teen Pregnancy Adolescent Family Life
and Abstinence Education Programs, Jan. 3, 2007; Legal Momentum, An Overview of Federal Abstinence
only Funding 8 (2007), http://www.legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/publications/OverviewofAbs.pdf
75
Amy Bleakley, et al., Public Opinion on Sex Education in US Schools, 160 Arch Pediatric Adolesc. Med.
1151, 1151-1152 (2006).
76
Christopher Trenholm et al, Impacts of Four Title Vi, Section 510 Abstinence Education Programs, Final
Report 3 (2007), http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/PDFs/impactabstinence.pdf.
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Family Life prevention projects have been abstinence only projects that complied with
the definition in the Welfare Reform Act.77
The amount of government funding for abstinence education increased from $10
million in 1997 to $167 million in 2005 78 to $177 million in 2007.79 This funding is
having an effect, at least on what is being taught. Adolescents were far more likely to
receive sex education that included only abstinence education in 2002 than in 1995.80
These programs address an issue – the regulation of adolescent sexuality – that
for many of the reasons discussed above is intrinsically divisive, and they do so in a
way that involves the fault line between religious and secular understandings, appeals
to absolute versus contextual values, the reaffirmation of authority rather than
empathy or autonomy.81 Moreover, abstinence education addresses a divide not only
in symbolic values, but as a practical component in the different understandings of the
transition to adulthood. Accordingly, abstinence only education is a cultural flash
point, and a locus for considering the role of religion in political and cultural conflicts.
These conflicts play out at two levels: ideological identification along traditionalist
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http://www.hutchison.senate.gov/RS20873.pdf
Laura Duberstein Lindberg, John S. Santelli, and Susheela Singh, Changes in Formal Sex Education:
1995-2002, 38 Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health (2006), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3818206.html.
79
Carmen Solomon-Fears, Scientific Evaluation of Approaches to Prevent Teen Pregnancy 4 (2007),
avail. at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RS22656_20070501.pdf.
80
Id. The authors report that the percentage of males receiving only such education increase from 9% to
24% [and for] females, from 8% to 21%).”
81
Even contentious issues, however, have more versus less divisive components. As Mary Ann Glendon
observed in Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, European legislatures tended to limit abortion to cases
necessary to save the life of the mother, but permitted implementation that treated emotional distress at the
prospect of carrying the child to term as a threat to the mother’s health. The result permitted extension of
the practice without the “moral affront” to those who opposed abortion in principle. It can also be termed
hypocritical in shielding the practice from public view.
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versus contextualist lines, and geographic differences in the socialization of the next
generation.
A. Sex as an Ideological Marker
All societies regulate sexuality, and instillation of norms channeling sexual energy
requires considerable societal effort.82 Nonetheless, these efforts do not always
command consensus support. Kristin Luker, in her fascinating examination of the
approaches of several communities to sex education, found a “chasm, wide and growing
wider, between the sexual right and left.”83 She was trying to understand why people,
raised in the same general cultural environments, become sexual liberals or sexual
conservatives.84 She characterized sexual conservatives, who typically opposed sex
education other than abstinence education, as “Old Testament types . . .[who] believe in a
moral code derived from God, not man,” while sexual liberals, who favored more
comprehensive forms of sex education, “have a more forgiving view of morality.”85
Consequently, for sexual conservatives, nonmarital sex is “wrong because the Bible says
it is,”86 while liberals are more fact oriented. Sexual liberals tended to see their
opposition, in non-neutral terms, as “Christian.”87 Sexual conservatives were, in fact,
more likely to attend church, and to attend theologically conservative churches at that, 88
but Luker emphasizes the complex relationship between sex and religion. She observes
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See, e.g., Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy 106-09 (Oxford University Press 1986); Sarah Blaffer
Hrdy, Mother Nature: Maternal Instincts and How They Shape the Human Species 252 (2000)(the rise of
monogamy required "elaborate modes of socialization, rituals, and whole mythologies ... to endorse male
control over the inconvenient sexual legacy that women inherited from their primate ancestors.")
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Kristin Luker, When Sex Goes to School 91-91 (2006)(emphasis in original).
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that sexual conservatives actively sought churches whose sexual teachings supported
their own, “especially when they felt their values were increasingly under assault in the
larger culture.”89 In contrast, sexual liberals, even if they were church attending
Christians, tended to regard the sexual conservatives as narrow-minded and intolerant90
and to prefer neighborhoods and congregations closer to their own views.
Taking these differences together, Luker concluded that sex, for the conservatives, is
sacred, while, for the liberals, it is natural.91 Sacred sex requires formal structures such
as marriage to protect it. Sexual conservatives accordingly champion the unity of sex,
marriage and procreation, with marriage as the institution ordained by God to unite
sexual pleasure with responsible family life and sex outside marriage sinful and
profane.92 Natural sex, in contrast, is to be enjoyed; it needs to be protected from the
worry and anxiety that come from sexual restrictions and guilt.93 For sexual liberals, it is
also not a defining component of family life – that rests more heavily on commitment,
companionship, communication and mutual respect.94 Moreover, sexual liberals, with
their emphasis on instrumental, contextual moral reasoning, “see no sense in (and are
deeply skeptical about) asking young people not to be sexual for a decade or two, if not
more.”95 Precisely because they, too, see marriage as important to realization of a full
life, they believe it should come relatively late in life, and not by accident, but by plan.96
These differences in attitudes toward sexuality, of course, correspond to more
general differences between conservative and liberal, devout and secular orientations.
89

Id. at 95-96.
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Most religions, and particularly fundamentalist ones, tend to preach against non-marital
sexuality. 97 And if non-marital sexuality is wrong, absolutists believe that schools
should take a consistent position against it. They cannot reconcile teaching abstinence
with providing information about birth control. As Mark Regnerus found in his
comprehensive study of sex education, parents who are “more devoutly religious” are
worried that discussing contraception will encourage their children to engage in sexual
activities.98 Moreover, they emphasize the importance of adherence to authority, and
reinforcement of the moral order.99

Conservative churches, in turn, solidify support for

raising the priority accorded sexual issues on the political agenda. Sexual liberals, in
contrast, emphasize individual autonomy and fulfillment. They see sexual practices
along a continuum of possibilities, and education designed to assist the responsible
exercise of choice.100 They place a higher premium on tolerance, and view sexuality per
se as an issue best addressed outside of the political arena.101
The rhetoric surrounding the renewal of Section V funding in 2007 shows these
different influences at work. One commenter rued the “seeming reluctance of Christians
to speak out about premarital, extramarital and other sexual sin,”102 while Rep. John
Boehner, the Republican Minority Leader, in seeking to extend Title V funding, used a
letter from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops warning about the failure to renew
97

Gary J. Simson & Erika A. Sussman, Keeping the Sex in Sex Education: The First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses and the Sex Education Debate, 9 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 265, 284-291 (2000);
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of the Divorce Puzzle, 18 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics, & Pub. Poly 7, 77-82 (2004). SIECUS has charged that
“abstinence only-until-marriage” curricula are “based on religious beliefs, rely on fear and shame . . “
Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States, SIECUS REVIEWS FEAR-BASED,
ABSTINENCE ONLY-UNTIL-MARRIAGE Curricula, http://www.siecus.org/reviews.html (2005).
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the funding.103 Conversely, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League rallies opponents of abstinence education around the heading “ideology over
science.”104
B. Demography and Anxiety
Ideology and symbolism aside, abstinence education also involves different
understandings of the transition to adulthood. While, as Luker underscores, conservative
versus liberal divisions exist within all communities, cultural differences play out at the
community level in the creation of consensus norms, and states constitute the relevant
political units for the implementation of sex education policies.105 The last election
showed states deeply divided, culturally and politically, with the priority given to “moral
values,” an important marker of the divisions.106 These differences correspond, however,
not just to different values, but to different underlying patterns in family formation.
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Cheryl Wetzstein, Abstinence-Only on Shaky Ground; Program funding Threatened Despite Parental
Support in Polls, Wash. Times, May 29, 2007, at A5.
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NARAL: Pro-Choice America, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/issues/sex-education/, last visited
September 5, 2007.
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For a discussion of the relationship between state family law, national constitutional norms and religion,
see Vivian Hamilton, PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 31 (2006).
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election. Moral values headed the list of voter concerns by a narrow plurality, with Bush voters
dramatically more likely to list moral values as their top concern than Kerry voters. The other issues
included the economy, terrorism, Iraq, taxes, education, and health care. See CNN.com, Election Results
(2005), http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html. Commentators
differed as to the role of moral values in determining the outcome of the 2004 election, but the analysis
most closely analyzing the moral values vote identified it, as this article does, with the intensity of religious
commitment. John C. Green and Mark Silk, Why Moral Values Did Count, 8 RELIGION IN THE NEWS
(2005), http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol8No1/WhyMoral%20ValuesDidCount.htm. Moreover,
in the regions that Bush carried, a higher percentage of Bush voters (two-fifths or more) ranked moral
values as their top concern, while Kerry carried the regions in which Bush voters ranked moral values as a
lesser concern. Accordingly, the moral values vote served as something of regional marker, and did so to a
greater degree than other top voter concerns. Id.
Nonetheless, the states form something of a continuum, albeit with clear regional differences,
particularly in the concentration of Democratic states. We have discussed the divisions elsewhere,
identifying the core “blue” or Democratic regions with the New England, mid-Atlantic and West Coast
states (California, Oregon and Washington). The rest of the country was red, with the most intensely red
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Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has described the changes nationally as new “pathways to
adulthood;”107 we have termed the changes the “new middle class morality.”108
Increasing emphasis on education has produced, at least for the middle class, later ages of
marriage and first birth.109 The result for the country as a whole is a larger gap between
the beginning of sexual activity and marriage. Whitehead reports that the average age of
first intercourse for 17 for women, 16 for men, while the average age of marriage is 25
for women and 26 for men.110 Delaying sexual activity until the mid-twenties (and later
for the college educated) is unrealistic at best. The result for sexual liberals, blue states,
and the upwardly mobile middle class is greater emphasis on contraception, and in many
cases abortion as the fallback.111 These changes present a direct affront to religious
sensibilities, as both sexual practices have changed and community support for tradition
moral understandings have atrophied.112 The results play out along geographic lines.
Brad Wilcox reports that, religion aside:
red state teens tend to hail from less-educated, working-class homes where
childbearing at an early age is not a big deal and a long-term orientation to life is
in short supply. Red state teens seem to feel as if they don't have much to lose if
areas including the mountain west states of Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming, the central plains (Nebraska,
Kansas, the Dakotas, Texas and Oklahoma), the South and border states. Battleground states, in contrast,
included the mid-West (e.g., Ohio, Iowa and Pennsylvania), and the Southwest states of New Mexico and
Nevada. CNN, supra, and Green and Silk, supra.
107
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108
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109
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women, determined by education, the average age of first birth has risen from 26 in 1970 to 32 today, and
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they give in to their passions--especially if sex occurs with someone they view as
a potential marital partner. More generally, as Thomas Sowell has observed, the
"redneck" culture of the working-class South does not foster restraint in general
and, more particularly, in matters sexual. 113
The great irony is that while red states may be more religious and more committed to
traditional values, they are also more likely to produce teen births, early marriage and
subsequent divorce. The incongruity then between belief and practice raises the level of
cultural anxiety, reinforcing the perceived importance of moral teachings about the
unacceptability of non-marital sex.
Moreover, while Luker emphasizes that all communities have sexual liberals and
conservatives, the causal factors that Wilcox identifies -- wealth, class, religion, and their
corresponding impact on age of family formation and sexual practices – vary by
region.114 They accordingly contribute to the formation of different underlying
understandings in different states. The relationship among the factors is complex;
wealthier states produce better educated citizens who are less religious and marry at later
ages.115 They may be wealthier because they are better educated or better educated
because they are wealthier, but the factors tend to be reinforcing and self-perpetuating
irrespective of the direction in which causality runs. This section examines them in turn
in an effort, not to untangle causation, but to create a cultural snapshot of the factors that
influence liberal versus conservative attitudes toward abstinence education.
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Contrary to historical patterns, greater wealth today correlates with greater support
for Democrats.116 The five states with the highest median household income in 2004
were New Jersey, Connecticut, Maryland, Alaska and Massachusetts – all but Alaska
were blue states concentrated in the New England and mid-Atlantic regions. 117 The five
top states by median family income were about the same: New Jersey, Connecticut,
Maryland, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, with Alaska falling to sixth, making the
sweep of northeastern states complete.118
The poorest states by median household income were West Virginia, Mississippi,
Arkansas, Louisiana and Montana (with Kentucky in a dead heat with Montana for the
fifth spot), and Mississippi, Arkansas, West Virginia, New Mexico, and Louisiana by
median family income.119 All are red states (though New Mexico only narrowly), and all
are concentrated in the South or mountain regions (though New Mexico is more
characteristic of the Southwest).120 The percentages of families below the poverty line
shows a similar picture, with the greatest percentages in Mississippi, New Mexico,
Louisiana, Arkansas and West Virginia, and the fewest in Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Alaska, Vermont and New Jersey (all blue except for Alaska).121
The differences in wealth, as Wilcox observes, may influence time horizons: those
with more to look forward to may be more likely to postpone immediate pleasures. One
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might expect religious observance, with its focus on the hereafter, to push back those
time horizons.122 At a wholesale level, however, it does not.123 The states with the
highest level of religious participation do not, by reason alone, result in either less
poverty or delayed childbearing.124 The five states with the highest level of church
attendance are among the poorest and reddest: South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Utah and Arkansas.125 Utah is wealthier than the others, and the only state outside the
South. The five states with the lowest level of church attendance are Vermont, New
Hampshire, Nevada, Maine and Massachusetts -- with all but Nevada in New England,
and all but Nevada voting blue (albeit with very close margins in New Hampshire and
Nevada).126
Age of family formation completes the regional map. The age of legal marriage in
most states is 18.127 In the United States, the median age of marriage for women is 25.1,
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while for men it is 26.7.128 This has changed dramatically since 1960, when the median
age at first marriage was 20.3 for women, and 22.8 for men.129

Today, the five states

with the lowest median age of marriage are Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Arkansas, and
Kentucky (all but Arkansas voting for Bush over Kerry by more than 20 percentage
points).130 Correspondingly, the states with the highest median age of marriage are
Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey (including four of
the top six blue states).131 Age of first birth complements the marriage figures, with the
same regional split. In 2000, Massachusetts had the highest mean age for a mother’s first
birth, at 27.8, followed by Connecticut (27.2), New Jersey (27.1), New Hampshire (26.7),
and New York (26.4) (with all but New York also among the top five in family income).
The lowest ages at first birth were in Mississippi (22.5), followed by Arkansas (22.7),
Louisiana and New Mexico (23.0), Oklahoma (23.1), and Wyoming (23.2) (four of the
top five among the poorest states in family income).132 Over the past 30 years, all states
have experienced an increase in the mean age of mothers at which the first child is born,
but the changes have been greatest in the northeast and smallest in Utah.133
Childbearing patterns, of course, reflect a combination of the level of sexual activity,
the acceptability of teen births and marriage, and access to contraception and abortion.
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Focusing on teen births, the five states with the lowest rates were New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine – all blue New England states. 134 In
contrast, the states with the highest teen birth rates were red Texas, New Mexico,
Mississippi, Arizona, and Arkansas, with Latino immigration skewing teen birth rates in
the Southwest. 135 A gauge on the acceptability of teen birth (or perhaps the
unacceptability of birth control and/or abortion) may be the percentage of teen births
within marriage. The states with the highest percentages of teen birth taking place within
marriage are Idaho, where only 64% of teen births are non-marital, Utah, with 66%,
Texas, with 73%, and Colorado, Kentucky, and Wyoming, each with 74%.136 These
states, which are concentrated in the mountain West, appear to encourage family
formation – in terms of both marriage and childbirth – at earlier ages.
Analysis of the increasing delay in marriage and childbearing, which has happened
faster and more dramatically in the blue states, underscores the correlation with wealth
and class. Wilcox, for example, argues that:
blue state teens from middle- and upper-class homes may be "sexually tolerant" but
also "perceive a bright future for themselves, one with college, advanced degrees, a
career, and a family." They view early and especially unprotected sex as a potential
threat to their plans for the future . . . . And so blue state teens--especially mainline
Protestant and Jewish teens from well-heeled homes--tend to delay intercourse, even
as they dabble in oral sex and pornography at higher rates than their red state peers.
Wilcox emphasizes further that because of “their strategic orientation,” blue state teens
who engage in intercourse (as most do before they turn 20), “are much more likely to rely
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on contraception than their red state peers, often with the winking or open support of
parents and local educators. . .”137 He concludes:
The strategic approach to sex found among well-off blue state teens certainly has its
merits: Among other things, they are much less likely to have a baby outside
wedlock, to marry before they are ready for the responsibilities of family life, and to
get divorced, than are working-class teens from red states. Their strategic approach to
sex and especially reproduction gives them a leg up in their drive for professional and
familial success.138
What Wilcox does not fully discuss is the application of these principles to those
unlikely to realize middle class restraint. Some studies suggest that, controlling for other
factors, religious teens may delay the beginning of sexual activity, but not necessarily
until marriage.139 At the same time, teens in the same community, who do not share the
depth of religious beliefs, may engage in sexual activities earlier than the religious teens,
but without as ready access to birth control or abortion as the teens in blue communities
more tolerant of sexual activity.140 The result may exacerbate the problems associated
with early pregnancy whether or not religious teachings succeed in reducing the overall
level of sexual activity. Moreover, the resulting pregnancies may in turn reinforce the
disadvantages to the children born to parents not yet ready to assume the responsibilities
of parenting.141 Lower levels of education or wealth may then in turn influences the
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religious and political predispositions of the next generation. Within this context, teen
births, not teen sex, may be the most critical issue in determining the cultural milieu that
shapes the next generation.
IV. The Intersection of Law and Culture
Abstinence education, while it supports the moral understandings of religious
conservatives, might be defended in secular terms. The Heritage Foundation, for
example, argues that “[t]he harmful effects of early sexual activity are well documented.
They include sexually transmitted diseases, teen pregnancy, and out-of-wedlock
childbearing.”142 Liberals and conservatives might applaud programs designed to delay
the beginning of sexual experimentation, and prevent unwanted pregnancies and sexually
transmitted diseases. The overwhelming evidence, however, is that abstinence only
programs are less effective than comprehensive sex education programs in doing so.
In a careful review of data from the National Survey of Family Growth published in the
American Journal of Public Health, the authors examined the bases for the declining
teenage pregnancy rate from 1995-2002.143 The researchers found: the rate of sexual
intercourse for 15-17 year-olds declined by about 10%, while it remained fairly stable for
18-19 year olds; the pregnancy risk for 15-17 year olds fell by 55%, while it declined by
27% for 18-19 year olds; the rate of condom use by 15-17 year olds increased by 20%,
from 38% to 58%, while it increased from 34% to 50% for 18-19 year olds; and the
researchers demonstrated that 14% of the change in pregnancy risk for 15-19 year olds
142
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was a decline in the number of sexually active young women, while 86% of the decrease
resulted from changes in contraceptive use.144 In an April 2007 comprehensive review of
Title V programs that was authorized by Congress, the authors found that youth who
participated in abstinence education programs were no more nor less likely to have
abstained from sex than those in a control group who had not received the abstinence
education programs.145 The study randomly assigned more than 2,000 youths to an
abstinence education program group or to a control group; four to six years after the
study began, the researchers also found virtually no differences between the age of first
sexual intercourse and the rate of unprotected sex for those who had received abstinence
education compared to those in the control group.146 The authors reported: “Findings
from this study provide no evidence that abstinence programs implemented in upper
elementary and middle schools are effective at reducing the rate of teen sexual activity
several years later,” although, as the authors noted, the study provided no evidence
concerning programs implemented at earlier or later ages.147
In 2005, the American Psychological Association also reviewed the existing
scientific literature and concluded that abstinence only education programs have limited
effectiveness in encouraging abstinence, and unintended consequences. Based on fifteen
years of research, the APA report concluded that comprehensive sex education programs
that included abstinence education with information about birth control were at least as
effective in discouraging early sexual activity and more effective in reducing pregnancies
144
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and sexually transmitted diseases.148 Similarly, a Center for Disease Control study
released in 2002 indicated that five of the government funded comprehensive sex
education programs appeared to produce successful results compared to none of the
abstinence only programs.149 Congressman Henry Waxman, in a report examining the
federally funded programs concluded that over eighty percent of federal grants go to
providing abstinence only curricula that "contain false, misleading, or distorted
information about reproductive health." 150 Moreover, other studies have shown the
incidence of abstinence, even if it reduces or delays sexual intercourse, to increase the
risk of sexually transmitted diseases as teens engage in unprotected oral or anal sex.151
In this context, the primary reason for adopting abstinence only programs becomes
religious or ideological,152 not child protection First, as we have noted above, absolutist
approaches place an emphasis on consistency. If non-marital sex is wrong, then the
ineffectiveness of the programs in delaying sexuality does not itself justify a shift to
programs that appear to sanction non-marital sexuality by providing greater access to
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contraception.153 Second, abstinence only programs may be a way of promoting more
traditional values generally. Those most likely to choose to implement such programs are
often faith-based or allied with faith-based groups, in part, because groups that do not
share such religious commitments are unlikely to seek to promote abstinence only
programs.154 Third, the programs may also reinforce patterns that lock in more traditional
ways of life. A lack of access to effective contraception promotes early marriage, either
as a deliberate choice or as a response to an improvident pregnancy. Early marriages in
turn tend to reinforce traditional gender roles, and greater emphasis on traditional family
understandings. In the modern era, these early marriages are also more likely to end in
divorce.155 Abstinence only programs thus reflect the values and life choices of one side,
and only one-side of a cultural divide.
It is accordingly unsurprising that implementation varies by region. In Title V of
the Social Security Act, one of the dedicated abstinence education earmarks, states decide
whether to participate, and, during the past several years, five states have refused
potential federal funding for abstinence education pursuant to this program.156 The five
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states – California, Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin157 – are all blue.158
The differences in approach reflect and are likely to reinforce cultural variation by region.
Legal challenges to the programs have focused overwhelming on the second
prong in this analysis – the use of federal funds to promote faith-based groups. The
cultural divide we have described, however, involves the first and third to a much
greater degree. Nonetheless, the programs’ strong religious associations provide a
richer legal target. In one of the more important cases to examine the permissibility of
government funding for religious-based service organizations, the Court rejected a
challenge to the inclusion of faith-based organizations as potential fundees pursuant to
the Adolescent Family Life Act.159 The AFLA explicitly recognizes the potential use
of religious organizations as potential support systems for families dealing with
adolescent pregnancy, and authorizes federal funding for eligible religious
organizations. The majority held that the purpose of the statute was secular, and it
anticipated that religious organizations could comply with the statutory mandate
without religious indoctrination. In a strong dissent, Justice Blackmun (joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens) noted that “the religious significance in the
counseling provided by some grantees . . .is a dimension that Congress specifically
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sought to capture by enlisting the aid of religious organizations.” 160 As the dissent
noted, various religious organizations will provide differing answers to questions of
how an adolescent should handle her pregnancy.161 Further, although the Court had
previously upheld providing aid to religious organizations which were administering
social welfare programs, in this case, the dissent noted:
There is a very real and important difference between running a soup
kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to make the
difficult decisions facing them. The risk of advancing religion at public expense,
and of creating an appearance that the government is endorsing the medium and
the message, is much greater when the religious organization is directly engaged
in pedagogy, with the express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior,
than where it is neutrally dispensing medication, food, or shelter.162
Unlike the majority, the dissent was highly skeptical that religious attitudes toward
counseling pregnant adolescents could be disentangled from the secular counseling
purposes for which the federal grant had been received.
In two subsequent cases brought by the American Civil Liberties Union against
specific service providers alleging that the abstinence education programs promote
religion, the parties have entered into consent decrees that carefully establish the
boundaries of acceptable language and religious messages. In 2002, the ACLU sued
the Louisiana Governor’s Program on Abstinence, claiming that, in a variety of ways,
it promoted religion through its own programs, that it funded organizations which
transmitted religious messages, and which were primarily sectarian, rather than
160
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secular.163 The Louisiana “programs that were going out and saying, you know, “get
saved by Jesus, sponsored by the governor's program on abstinence.” 164 Two months
after the suit was filed, the court entered a preliminary injunction that prohibited the
state from funding any religious activities and “pervasively sectarian institutions,” and
required the state to develop a monitoring mechanism to guarantee that abstinence
education funds were not used for religious purposes.165 Shortly thereafter, the state
and the ACLU entered into a settlement agreement in which the state promised to
clarify that government-sponsored abstinence programs could not include religious
messages or promote religion in any way.166 The state also agreed to investigate any
allegation that abstinence programs had religious content. 167 The ACLU returned to
court in 2005, claiming violations of the settlement agreement because “the governor's
program continues to feature religious materials on its official website,
AbstinenceEdu.com. State-appointed experts advise readers, for example, that
"abstaining from sex until entering a loving marriage will . . . [make you] really, truly,
'cool' in God's eyes" and that "God is standing beside you the whole way" if you
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commit to abstinence.”

168

This time, the judge upheld the religious content of the

state’s website, finding no excessive entanglement.169
A second suit, filed three years later, concerned funds appropriated to the Silver
Ring Thing (SRT)170 as part of a special Congressional earmark. The ACLU of
Massachusetts accused the federal government of providing a “direct government
grant to a pervasively sectarian institution . . .[with] federal dollars [] demonstrably
underwriting religions activities and religious content.”171 Among other allegations,
the ACLU asserted that each Silver Ring was inscribed with a verse from the New
Testament, and was accompanied by a SRT Bible; that the SRT 12-step follow-up
program included the SRT student acknowledging that “God has a plan for his or her
life, and a plan for his or her sexuality;”172 and that the SRT Newsletter included
information such as: “’more people are becoming part of this abstinence phenomenon.
And ultimately, they are developing a relationship with Jesus Christ. This is such
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good news.’”173 Three months after the filing of the SRT lawsuit, HHS withheld
funding of the remaining $75,000 of the SRT’s $1.2 million.174
The parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which SRT agreed
that, if it sought further funding, it would certify its compliance with applicable
federal regulations, which prohibit using federal funds to support “inherently religious
activities.”175 The Department of Health and Human Services sent a list of
“Safeguards Required” if SRT sought additional federal money; the safeguards
included requiring that abstinence education programs with religious content
constitute separate and distinct programs from those funded by federal money,
including a requirement that each program have a distinct name.176 As Professors
Chip Lupu and Bob Tuttle point out, the settlement agreement establishes a distinction
between the religious activities that the government can support and those that are
“inherently religious activities” in “terms that are constitutionally accurate,
unambiguous, and detailed.”177
These cases, however, which address the direct use of these programs to promote
religion, miss the larger issue of the promotion of cultural issues integrated with
religious views at a time when the majority of American do not share them. In
surveys of the public attitude toward abstinence education, researchers repeatedly find
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broad support for comprehensive information. The level of support, however, varies,
depending on the participants’ frequency of attendance at a religious institution; and
evangelicals have a different approach than non-evangelicals. 178 In a survey of 1000
people in late 2005, among people who attend religious services more frequently than
once per week, 31.3% opposed abstinence only education, while among those who
never attend religious services, 57% opposed abstinence only.179
In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia accused Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion,
which struck down Texas’s same-sex sodomy statutes, as having “taken sides in the
culture war.”180 Abstinence only education does so to a much greater degree.
Comprehensive sex educations program provide information about and support for
abstinence; abstinence only programs do not provide similar information about
contraception, abortion or non-reproductive sexuality. If the programs were effective in
the religiously and culturally neutral objectives of delaying the beginning of sexuality,
slowing the spread of STD’s, and preventing unwanted pregnancies, the efforts would be
applauded on both sides of the cultural divide. In the face of convincing evidence that
they are both ineffective and counter-productive, they become little more than a vehicle
for the partisan promotion of religiously identified, cultural views.181
V. Toward Consensus? Yes and No
The law can diffuse or inflame the cultural conflicts described in this paper.
Abstinence only education itself is a very public endorsement of one side of the cultural
178
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divide. In contrast, judicial decisions that distinguish between promotion of sectarian
views and more secular forms of abstinence shift the discussion to more specialized and
less intrinsically divisive issues. The very decision to advocate public funding for
religious groups to promote religiously identified views was a calculated political
decision;182 the question then becomes how the judiciary and the public respond.
The law has several distinct means for responding to these different approaches to
teen sexuality. First, rather than one side trying to convert the other to the “right” view, it
might be appropriate to examine any potential points of convergence,183 and then, as
suggested by the cultural cognition literature, to develop programs for building dialogue.
After all, attitudes toward sexuality are on a continuum. At one extreme are those who
would permit casual sexual activity between anyone who consents.184 At the other end
are those who believe that sex should be limited to reproductive purposes within
marriage, they would disapprove of sodomy and contraception even within marriage.185
In the center is a large group that believes non-marital births are a greater problem than
non-marital sex, and that use of contraception, not the negative example of the births, is
the most important factor in decreasing their incidence.186 Notwithstanding the potential
for consensus, activists do, however, divide into dichotomous groups, and group loyalty
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may be more important than the merits of an individual issue in determining political
behavior such as voting.187 Accordingly, the potential for discourse within communities,
where appeals to reason are not confounded by appeals to loyal, may offer greater
potential for compromise, than discourse between communities.188
Some religious leaders, for example, have recognized the importance of using the
language of faith to support the need for comprehensive sex education, so appealing to
rhetoric that might satisfy both sides by promoting discourse within each position – for
example, comprehensive sex education advocated by faith communities. The Religious
Institute on Sexual Morality, Justice, and Healing, which is an interfaith organization
devoted to issues of advocating for sexual health and related issues in “faith
communities,”189 issued an “Open Letter to Religious Leaders on Adolescent
Sexuality.”190 The Letter uses faith-based language, such as recognizing that “sexuality
is a divinely bestowed blessing,” and empirical evidence on teen pregnancy and sexually
transmitted diseases to argue that faith communities must acknowledge that adolescents
may belong to sexual minorities, may be abstinent, and may have been involved in sexual
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See discussion of increased partisan identification and political divisions over values issues at notes
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relationships, and that society must promote comprehensive sexuality education.191 This
approach, using language that appeals to both sides, seems appropriate. Ensuring that
leaders within the different communities persuasively advocate, however, seems
somewhat more difficult to ensure.
In addition to examining places of “overlapping consensus” 192 between the two
different systems, a second approach draws on the federalist nature of family law, and
then suggests one of two possibilities: either states could continue to experiment with
different approaches before imposing a national standard that would privilege one side, or
the federal government could, in an attempt to prevent further divergence, simply impose
a national norm. We explore these issues more comprehensively in a companion
article.193 In the context of abstinence education, however, suffice it to say that the
current status of federal law shows the danger of a national law that reflects only one side
of the controversy and that rejects empirical evidence on the most appropriate policies.194
Indeed, with a Democratically controlled House of Representatives, the continuation of
Title V funding became highly questionable in mid-2007, and key members of Congress
indicated their support for comprehensive sex education programs that included
abstinence as well as other forms of education.195
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Moreover, we are concerned that compromise dilutes the underlying messages
concerning teen sexuality. Conservatives and religious organizations are unwilling to
recognize the value of other forms of sex education, while liberals, who share comparable
goals of responsible sexuality, are more pragmatic and tolerant. Compromise, which
might involve teaching sex education, but only the abstinence education component, is, in
this formulation, concession. As one editorial bluntly explained, “The lavish spending
[on abstinence education] reflects the Bush administration's blind faith in abstinence only
and its insistence that the sole message kids receive is that premarital sex is wrong. In
such programs, even whispering the word "contraceptive" dilutes the "no sex" mantra.”196
Given that more information and program evaluation are virtually irrelevant in changing
positions, that compromise can mean foregoing fundamental values, then the political
process becomes the most promising avenue for change. And the means for doing that
involve learning from both Lakoff and the Cultural Cognition Project: reframe the issues
by using the language of the other side.197 Indeed, when the leading Democratic
contenders in the 2008 Presidential campaign spoke movingly at a forum on faith about
the significance of religion to their lives, prompting a charge that the Democrats sounded
like “evangelicals,” compared to the Republicans, who sounded like “secularists.”198
Finally, political scientists and lawyers have each been involved in a longstanding
debate: does change come from imposing the law or from grass-roots pressure? The
recent history of Supreme Court family law cases, from Loving199 to Roe200 to Roper201
196
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to Gonzales v. Carhart,202 shows both; individual states changed their laws, responding to
changing moral and popular sentiment, and ultimately prompted the Supreme Court to
revise national standards.
Conclusion
Religion, as the evolutionary biologists and election observers both observe, is a
critical factor in developing moral values. When religion overlaps with partisan identity,
and when politicians deliberately frame partisan issues in terms of cultural divisions,
dichotomous (or at least seemingly dichotomous) positions dominate debate.203 As the
approaches threaten to diverge even more, as those who attend religious services at least
once a week and those who rarely attend – if ever – reach opposite conclusions on
fundamental issues, finding common themes becomes increasingly important. Ironically,
perhaps, these calls for compromise typically come from only one side, providing some
grounds for pessimism. In the short term, using the consensus positions developed by
some within the faith-based community as a means for talking to both sides may provide
a way forward.
Ultimately, however, on issues of family values, the more direct introduction of
religion into public life runs the risk of further polarizing discourse, and hardening
opposing positions in ways that short-circuit the evolution of the underlying normative
values. While profound disagreement would exist in any event, religion may exacerbate
those differences by linking policy positions to issues of identity, and doing so in a way
that hampers effective discourse or compromise. Religion complicates these difficulties
in the following ways:
202
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1.

The form of argument: Many communities of faith accept more authoritarian styles

of argument likely to be rejected by secular communities. It is commonplace, for
example, to find comments like the following on the Web: “The Bible clearly and
consistently tells us that homosexual activity is a sin.204 God does not create a person
with homosexual desires. A person becomes a homosexual because of sin,205 and
ultimately because of his or her own choice.”206 These comments state a conclusion in
terms of an appeal to authority that brooks no discussion or dissent. When they are
advanced as a basis for public policy outcomes, they also alienate those who do not share
the same perspective.
2.

The role of religion in creating identity: Citizenship in a democracy is mediated by

overlapping membership in various groups, each of which contributes partially to the
individual’s construction of self. When one form of identity becomes comprehensive to
the exclusion of others, it can build in isolation and extremism. Consider Ayaan Hirsi
Ali’s description of the role of the veil within Muslin communities in Europe:
The veil is an expression of the moral philosophy they [veil wearing Islamic
women] hold and wish to impose upon others. They seek to provoke, to intimidate.
In many European cities it is increasingly common to see girls, sometimes as young
as 5, with headscarves tied tightly around their necks, or even little veils. They are
taught to keep away from boys, from unbelievers and from Muslims who are weak in
the faith--in other words, other unveiled Muslim little girls. That is precisely the
purpose of the veil.207
The Catholic Church’s suggestion that pastors should deny communion to those who
204
205
206
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support abortion rights, while less premised on physical separation, also serves to draw
an impermeable line between observant Catholics and others.208 In contrast, the principle
of tolerance may require separation of appropriate behavior and arguments within public
society from the form and content of beliefs that may be privately held.
3.

Religious beliefs often encourage behavior that reinforces identification with the

faith. Fundamentalist religions, for example, often encourage early marriage and large
families. These large families are then welcomed into communities of faith that provide
support for childrearing. Given the dependence that children produce, managing outside
of the marriage or the faith-based community becomes that much more difficult. Darren
Sherkat writes that:
Studies consistently show that among sectarian Protestant fertility is higher, and ages
of marriage are lower The burden of early marriage and fertility are also likely
factors in low rates of educational attainment for conservative Christian men, since
having a family often requires forsaking future rewards which could accrue from
educational attainment for the immediate benefits of employment. Large family size,
coupled with limited wealth, will also hinder sectarian Christian parents’ ability to
help finance the educational pursuits of their children. This may help explain lower
rates of college attendance and completion among conservative Christians.209
Such results produce reinforcing cycles as the habits of mind of the more educated and
less educated may be reinforced by different experiences and values.
4. To the extent that religious membership then correlates more strongly with
family form and political party identification,210 a single more ideological, more partisan
or more sectarian identity can work to undermine the partial roles that have historically
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allowed democratic institutions to bridge differences. Members of Congress, for
example, once viewed their loyalty to Congress as an institution as separate from their
roles as Democrats or Republicans. If the well-being of the nation, however, is identified
with the inflexible content of certain beliefs, then the institutions themselves can be
sacrified to advance the right causes.
Greater partisanship can also be self-reinforcing. A liberal columnist in the Los
Angeles Times observed, for example, “Your average conservative may not know
anything about climate science, but conservatives do know they hate Al Gore. So, hold
up Gore as a hate figure and conservatives will let that dictate their thinking on the
issue.” The net result is that as the evidence of global warming has increased, the
percentage of Republicans who respond to public opinion polls by saying that the case
has been made has decreased.211
5. Neutralizing the role of the courts: Federal political appointments have clearly
become politicized and in many states the public elects judges or votes to continue them
in office.212 To the extent that the courts lack independence, and to the extent that
cautious, legally grounded decision become defined in partisan terms, the court lose their
ability to provide effective leadership. At that point, legislative judgments become
paramount.213
Polarization not only increases conflict over issues such as the control of
adolescent sexuality, but it also slows the evolution of new norms within and across
211
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communities. The adoption of same-sex marriage in Canada, for example, has spurred a
debate with gay and lesbian communities about the meaning of marriage, and the sight of
same-sex couples affirming their unions has helped to remake the image of marriage as
less patriarchal and more egalitarian.214 In similar fashion, the ineffectiveness of
abstinence only policies should spark debate about the consequences of unplanned
pregnancies and the need for contraception. If the positions on these issues, however,
become matters of loyalty, then the more moderate compromises that might allow
institutions to grow and change, and that might provide children with enough information
so that they can make their own choices, become impossible. Compromising on
language – using the language of faith – to advocate the same policies may provide
leverage where trumpeting the results of new studies will not. Compromising on the law
– allowing abstinence only education because it is at least a form of sex education –
serves no one. Highly publicized and contentious battles over adolescent sex education
in legislatures and courts involving constitutional issues of free exercise provide an
example of how religious rhetoric trumps legal standards. As the country develops red
and blue family models, religion is a significant factor in creating and maintaining those
models through its efforts to control teen sexuality to foster particular family forms.
Religion reinforces conflicting approaches to fundamental cultural values, affecting the
laws surrounding the family lives of Americans.
.
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Appendix A
Teen Sexuality Regulation and Church Attendance
215

State

Teen
Required Parental
Teen
Church
Pregnancy Abortion Attendance
Involvement in Minors’
Abortions216
Rate
Rate
24-58% 219
217
218
Rank
Rank
Consent Notification None
Alabama r
X
15
30
58%
▼
Alaska r
30
35
N/A
Arizona r
X
2
19
35%
Arkansas r
X
10
41
55%
▼
California
7
5
32%
Colorado r
X
22
21
35%
Connecticut
X
33
9
37%
Delaware
X*220
11
8
43%
DC
X
na
na
33%
Florida r
X
6
7
N/A
Georgia r
X
8
22
52%
Hawaii
X
12
6
N/A
Idaho r
§
37
45
43%
▼
Illinois
20
10
42%
Indiana r
X
31
38
46%
Iowa
X
43
42
46%
Kansas r
X
34
39
47%
Kentucky r
X
25
47
48%
Louisiana r
X
19
44
58%
Maine
X
46
31
31%
Maryland
X*
13
3
41%
Massachusetts
X
40
11
31%
Michigan
X
27
15
N/A
Minnesota
Both
47
36
44%
parents
Mississippi r
Both
3
28
57%
parents
Missouri r
X
29
34
46%
▼
Montana r
38
32
34%
Nebraska r
X
41
40
53%
215

Red indicates that George W. Bush won the state in the 2004 presidential election; Blue indicates that
John Kerry won the state in the 2004 presidential election.
216
Except where indicated, parental involvement laws in minors’ abortions require the involvement of one
parent and apply to minors under 18.
217
Ranking by rates of pregnancy per 1,000 women aged 15-19 according to state of residence, 2000.
218
Ranking by rates of abortion per 1,000 women aged 15-19 according to state of residence, 2000.
219
Church or Synagogue Attendance by State, San Diego Union-Tribune, May 2, 2006. The national
average is 42% or people who say they attend a church or synagogue either once a week or almost once per
week. There are no blue states in the top 15, and only one red state in the bottom 15.
220
Law applies to women under 16
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Nevada r
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico r
New York
North
Carolina r
North Dakota
r
Ohio r
Oklahoma r
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South
Carolina r
South Dakota
r
Tennessee r
Texas r
Utah r
Vermont
Virginia r
Washington
West Virginia
r
Wisconsin
Wyoming r
Total

▼
▼

1
48

4
25

27%
24%

▼

16
4
14
9

1
18
2
17

34%
41%
33%
53%

50

48

43%

28
21
23
39
36
17

27
37
13
23
16
24

43%
50%
32%
43%
N/A
58%

44

49

45%

18
5
45
49
32
26
35

29
26
50
33
20
12
46

52%
49%
55%
24%
44%
32%
46%

42
24

43
14

43%
36%

▼
X
X
Both
parents
X
X
X
X
X
X221
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X*
X*
X
25

18

7+
DC

▼ Enforcement permanently enjoined by court order; policy not in effect.
§ Temporarily blocked by court order; policy not in effect.
* Allows specified health professionals to waive parental involvement if judge is
unavailable.
˜ Physicians may, but is not required to, inform the minor’s parent
.
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